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Abstract
This paper models the interdependence of parental inter vivos gifts and childrens home
purchases when informal care a¤ects decision making. We use data from Japanese house-
holds who purchased a detached house in an urban area to test this strategic interaction.
Considering both censoring and endogeneity of inter vivos gifts, which are identied by
information on formal care, our preferred results demonstrate that inter vivos gifts do not
signicantly increase the purchase price of housing. Theory suggests that this occurs when
informal care tends to be a heavy burden for children. However, subsample analysis of
young home buyers indicates that the empirical results are consistent with the literature:
children who receive parental gifts tend to purchase a higher-priced dwelling. One poten-
tial explanation is that relatively young adult children are less likely to take charge of care
obligations, and accordingly, parental gifts are only expected to relax their liquidity con-
straints. Subsample analysis appears to indicate that the underlying motivation of parental
gifts is inuenced by the timing of childrens home purchase decisions.
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1 Introduction
As a conventional mortgage requires approximately 20 percent down payment on a loan, home-
buying households must build up substantial savings; therefore, down payment constraints may
distort the optimal housing consumption (Artle and Varaiya 1978). Parental gifts are expected
to relax this borrowing constraint. Indeed, previous studies have demonstrated that inter vivos
gifts by parents to their adult children play an important role in increasing down payments
and raising the value of the acquired house (Engelhardt and Mayer 1998; Guiso and Jappelli
2002; Zhou 2007; Luea 2008; Spilerman and Wol¤ 2012).
The claim that inter vivos gifts encourage housing demand seems to be induced from
rational behavior. This can be true when parents have an altruistic preference: an increase in
parental gifts only has an impact similar to an increase in income for home purchases. Parental
gifts are simply used to increase the well-being of children from the childrens point of view;
therefore, children tend to purchase a higher-priced dwelling. The question is then whether
or not parents freely provide inter vivos gifts even in the aging societies that most developed
countries are facing. In such a society, parents may provide nancial transfers in exchange
for receiving informal care. That is, inter vivos gifts are not always available for children to
nance dwelling purchases. Accordingly, the e¤ect of inter vivos gifts on housing consumption
becomes more complex.
Although substantial inter vivos gifts are implicitly associated with informal care and are
frequently earmarked for home purchases, empirical evidence on this issue is limited to date.
This may reect the fact that even though researchers obtain information on the value of
inter vivos gifts and housing consumption, they cannot obtain information on informal care.
Our data set appears to face the same problem. To overcome this problem, we use publicly
available information on formal care, which is a substitute for informal care to some extent
(Van Houtven and Norton 2004).
A theoretical model of strategic interaction between inter vivos gifts and the home purchase
price leads to an empirical model where the home purchase price is a function of the value of
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inter vivos gifts, which depends on formal care. Our theory suggests that inter vivos gifts do
not always increase the purchase value of an acquired house. To test this hypothesis, we use
a repeated cross section of households who purchased a detached house in an urban area of
Japan. Japanese evidence may provide interesting insights. In Japan, home ownership rates of
younger generations have been declining substantially, potentially because economic stagnation
has deteriorated the employment situation among young people. Inter vivos gifts thus seem to
be particularly important for children in home purchases. On the other hand, older generations
have accumulated a large portfolio of nancial assets to fund their postretirement lives. Parents
used to use a certain amount of these funds as rewards for informal care provided by children
(Izuhara 2004).1 Therefore, exchange tends to be the traditional and primary motive for
transfers from parents to children in Japan. Japan, however, faces the most rapid growth
in the proportion of elderly in the population in the world. Reecting the heavy burden of
informal care, a social insurance scheme for long-term care has been designed to promote the
formal care market (Izuhara 2004; Abe 2009). This indicates that parents can consider formal
care, which may substitute for informal care, when they decide the value of inter vivos gifts.
As a benchmark, we examine the impact of inter vivos gifts on home values, using OLS.
The empirical results are consistent with parentsbehaving in an altruistic way: the prices
of homes purchased are positively associated with inter vivos gifts. However, there may be
a problem of potential endogeneity of inter vivos gifts because of omitted variables such as
the liquidity constraints of children, which have an impact on both childrens and parents
behavior. From our theory, we use proxy variables of formal care that appear to a¤ect the
value of inter vivos gifts for identication to deal with this endogeneity. Indeed, our empirical
results indicate that inter vivos gifts are signicantly a¤ected by formal care. In addition to the
possible endogeneity, we must account for censoring of inter vivos gifts, because observations
of inter vivos gifts are limited to values greater than or equal to zero. Considering these two
issues, our empirical results demonstrate that inter vivos gifts have no signicant e¤ect on the
1Japanese Civil Law may justify this. According to this Civil Law, a successor who has made substantial
contributions to the maintenance, or to the increase in the value, of the predecessors estate through medical
treatment or nursing of the predecessor, or by other means, is entitled to receive a gift of greater value than
his/her legal portion of an inheritance. This is called a contributory portion.
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purchase price. This suggests that exchange is an additional motive to consider regarding the
relationship between inter vivos gifts and housing acquisition.
Subsample analysis, however, indicates that di¤erences in parental transfer motives exist
between the two subgroups. We examine the subsamples that categorize children into two
groups: householders aged below 35 years and householders aged 35 years and over. Even when
we consider endogeneity and censoring of inter vivos gifts, the empirical results demonstrate
that parental gifts have a signicant positive impact on housing demand for children who
are relatively young, a nding that is inconsistent with the above results. Namely, parents
behavior is based on a relatively weak exchange motive for this subgroup, but not for the other
subgroup. The underlying motivation of parental gifts tends to be inuenced by the timing of
childrens home purchases in the life course.
2 Literature review
2.1 Inter vivos gifts and exchange
Altruism is one of the well-known explanations of patterns of wealth transfer from parents to
their adult children (Becker 1974). According to the altruism model, parents care about the
well-being of their children, and they are more likely to leave their assets to the children who
have less income. Bernheim et al. (1985) suggested that in addition to altruism, exchange is
another motive for bequest. In their theoretical model, parental bequest is used to inuence
the amount of attention provided by children. Namely, children agree to provide attention to
their parents in exchange for receiving a bequest. Controlling for the endogeneity of parental
bequests by the parentslifetime earnings, the empirical results of the 2SLS appear to support
their hypothesis: attention, which is measured by visiting and making phone calls, is positively
a¤ected by parental bequest.
Cox (1987) used inter vivos transfers to examine the exchange motive for intergenerational
transfers instead of bequest wealth, because the majority of private income transfers occur
between living persons in the US. Di¤erent from the altruism case, in the case of exchange,
parents potentially increase transfers to induce attention from wealthy children if there are no
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close market substitutes for attention. Indeed, both the Probit and the Tobit models, which
consider the censoring of inter vivos gifts, suggest that inter vivos gifts are positively related
to childrens income.
Norton and Van Houtven (2006) argued that parents are more likely to use inter vivos gifts
than bequests for exchange. One of the reasons is that inter vivos gifts can be adjusted quickly
to the amount of informal care and attention. In the empirical analysis, informal care was the
focus because it tends to be easier to measure and may involve more of the childrens e¤ort
and time. They examined the reverse causation inherent in inter vivos transfer and informal
care, and used the Logit model with household xed e¤ects to control for the endogeneity bias
of informal care. The results suggested that, as expected, children who provide informal care
appear to receive larger inter vivos transfers. Using di¤erent longitudinal surveys in the US,
Norton et al. (2013) found qualitatively similar results.
2.2 Inter vivos gifts and housing demand
Previous empirical evidence has suggested that parental inter vivos gifts have a positive impact
on childrens housing demand. Engelhardt and Mayer (1998) analyzed the impact of transfers
targeted for rst-time home buyers based on a repeated cross section of households in 18
major US cities. A housing down payment and mortgage debt were modeled as functions of
transfers. The OLS estimates indicated that transfers increase the down payment and increase
the mortgage debt. They then concluded that transfer recipients are likely to increase the
value of the home that they purchase, because the home value is dened as the sum of the
down payment and the mortgage debt.
Guiso and Jappelli (2002) used a retrospective cross section of both home owners and
renters in Italy. Treating renters as censored observations, they estimated the home value
function using a Tobit regression model. Similar to Engelhardt and Mayer (1998), they found
that bequests and inter vivos gifts allow households to purchase more expensive homes. They
suggested that transfers have a strong positive e¤ect on the value of homes purchased, because
over two-thirds of gifts are received in the year preceding the purchase in their sample.
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Luea (2008) examined separately the impacts of nancial help and inter vivos gifts on home
values. She hypothesized that nancial help, which is received more frequently and in smaller
increments, is expected to have a smaller impact on home values than inter vivos gifts, which
are received as large lump sums. She estimated the home value function using a random e¤ects
model based on US household-level panel data for both rst-time and existing home owners.
The empirical results supported her hypothesis: nancial help does not have a signicant
impact on home values, while inter vivos gifts do have a positive and signicant impact.
Spilerman and Wol¤ (2012) examined the consequences of parental transfers for the down
payment proportion and the home value. Using a cross section of homeowners in France,
they estimated a home value function by OLS. Their empirical results indicated that both
the incidence and amount of inter vivos gifts received before the home purchase increase the
home value of adult children. Using respondents who have never purchased a home, they also
demonstrated that transfers before a home purchase increase the down payment proportion.
On the other hand, the coe¢ cients of both the incidence and amount of inter vivos gifts
received after a home purchase have a negative and insignicant e¤ect, indicating that they
have no impact on the home value. They also showed, using descriptive statistics, that children
who receive a large transfer are less likely to reduce nonhousing consumption expenditures.
This appears to indicate that parental transmissions earmarked for a home purchase can have
spillover e¤ects to other aspects of living standards.
The studies mentioned above that focus on the e¤ect of inter vivos gifts on housing demand
have given little attention to the motives behind parental transfer decisions. Cirman (2008),
however, examined the hypothesis that if the motives for intergenerational transfers earmarked
for housing acquisition are related to liquidity constraints, then their incidence is tied to the
conditions in the housing market and the market for housing nance. To test the hypothesis,
she used a telephone interview of Slovenian households, where the dependent variable in a linear
regression model is the incidence of transfers received from their families to acquire housing,
and the independent variables relate to the housing market such as interest rates and housing
prices. The empirical results demonstrated that intergenerational transfers for acquiring a
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residential property increase when both housing prices and interest rates are relatively high.
From this, she concluded that transfers can act as an informal source of housing nance and
can play a cushioning role in harsh market conditions. This suggests that parents are altruistic,
and therefore parents help their children when they are confronted with unfavorable housing-
related conditions.
Zhou (2007) used visiting as an instrument to consider the endogeneity of intergenera-
tional transfers. She employed a cross section of couples who have preschool children from
six Japanese prefectures. The Tobit model indicated that visiting has a signicantly positive
impact on the amount of intergenerational transfers, which is consistent with exchange. She
then regressed the down payment and the home value on the predicted amount of intergener-
ational transfers. The empirical results, however, were similar to those of previous studies in
which the house value and the down payment tend to increase with increases in the predicted
generational transfers.
In sum, the literature has appeared to arrive at a consensus that parental gifts raise the
home value of children, except in the case of gifts received after home purchase derived from
Spilerman and Wol¤ (2012).
3 The model
The purpose of this section is to develop a theoretical model that considers the observable
characteristics in our empirical study. The theory leads to testable hypotheses and informs the
empirical work. There are two players in the model: a donor, say the parent, and a recipient,
the child. The parent is assumed to be imperfectly altruistic: the parent cares for the utility
of the child, whereas the parent cares about services that the child may provide. On the other
hand, the child is assumed to be nonaltruistic. We adopt the following two-stage framework:
the parent rst decides how much to give in terms of nonnegative inter vivos gifts g to the
child, and an amount of formal care m in the market. The child then decides a consumption of
housing h and composite good x, given the size of gifts made by the parent. Our model applies
a simple noncooperative game framework with a Stackelberg equilibrium that can examine
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strategic interaction between g and h. As mentioned in Section 1, one of the reasons that gifts
are provided by the parent is the exchange motive: the child provides services in exchange for
g. The literature has suggested that services may include both attention and informal care,
whereas we assume that services measure only the level of informal care s. Norton and Van
Houtven (2006) and Norton et al. (2013) also focused only on informal care, because it can be
measured easily. Our main concern, however, is that we cannot observe informal care from our
data. To consider this issue, we assume that the parent directly controls s using inter vivos
gifts g. Namely, if the child agrees to receive a nonnegative value of g, then in exchange, the
child must provide positive s. We suppose that s is given as an increasing linear function of g:
s = s(g), s = s(0), and sg > 0, sgg = 0, where s indicates the constant and minimum level of
informal care regardless of g, and the subscripts indicate the rst and second derivatives. The
implication of Bernheim et al. (1985) is that an increase in gifts increases services: sg > 0.
We believe that this assumption may capture the essence of exchange. On the other hand, the
literature has suggested that there are generally no market substitutes for a childs services.
Empirical evidence in the health economics literature, however, has demonstrated that informal
care by the child is a substitute for formal care such as nursing home care and hospital care
(Van Houtven and Norton 2004). Following this evidence, we explicitly consider m as a choice
variable for the parent.
Assume that the utility function of the child depends on h, s, and x. We assume that the
price of housing is normalized to 1, because we can only observe the purchase price from the
data. This implies that h is expressed in terms of monetary amounts. Note that Guiso and
Jappelli (2002) treated renters as censored observations (h = 0). However, we do not have
this information, and consequently we only consider the case where h > 0. Because we focus
mainly on h and s, the utility function of the child is assumed to be separable as follows:
U = u(h; s) + (x): (1)
Both h and x are assumed to increase subutility at a decreasing rate: uh > 0, uhh < 0, x > 0,
and xx < 0. We assume that the child derives disutility from nursing services at a decreasing
8
rate; namely, us < 0 (Cox 1987) and uss < 0.
The budget constraint of the child becomes:
yC + g = h+ px; (2)
where yC is the income of the child, and p is the price of the composite. The inter vivos gift is
only intended for a housing acquisition in the data used in the empirical section. To avoid the
corner solution, we assume that the inter vivos gift does not impose a binding constraint. This
adds an extra constraint that a solution of h is larger than g: h > g. Indeed, 99.7 percent of
a sample that we will use in the empirical part suggests h > g. To repeat, s is not the choice
variable for the child. Substituting s = s(g) and the budget constraint into the utility function
Eq. (1) yields the result that the choice variables are reduced to only one variable: h. Solving
this unconstrained utility maximization problem, we have the following home value function:
h = h(g; yC ; p): (3)
The primary variable of interest is g. Di¤erentiating the home value function with respect
to a given amount of inter vivos gift, we obtain:
@h
@g
=
@h
@yC
  uhssg
Uhh
; (4)
where Uhh (Uhh < 0) is the second-order condition for U .
As usual, the sign @h=@g depends on the assumed sign of derivative of the marginal utility
of housing with respect to informal care uhs. First, let us suppose that u(h; s) is additively
separable. This implies uhs = 0. Then, inter vivos gifts unambiguously raise the house value
because the rst term of the right-hand side of Eq. (4) is positive, while the second term is
zero. Namely, an increase in g has a similar impact to an increase in income. Second, let
us relax the separability assumption and replace it with the more plausible assumption of a
negative mixed partial derivative of utility with respect to housing and service, uhs < 0. The
negative sign of uhs implies that if there is an increase in the unpleasant care burden, then
the marginal utility of the home value decreases. Plausible justication for this assumption is
that the marginal utility of housing is decreasing in informal care because relaxing at home is
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less comfortable when it interferes with caring for parents (Victorio and Arnott 1993). In this
case, inter vivos gifts do not always increase the house value: an increase in g has a negative
impact on h through the childs utility function (the second term). Similar to the rst case
(uhs = 0), an increase in g still has a positive impact on h through the budget constraint (the
rst term). As a result, g has an ambiguous impact on h.
Consider a case where @h=@g  0. Then subutility u(h; s) decreases when the child receives
parental gifts, because an increase in g increases s, while it does not increase h. The child,
however, can increase the subutility (x) by receiving g. Indeed, we restrict our analysis to
the case where the increment of (x) is larger or at least equal to the reduction in u(h; s) by
obtaining g, which we discuss later (see Eq. 7).
Now, we consider parental behavior. The private utility function of the parent depends on
s and m. Because the income of the parent is not observed from the data, the private utility is
assumed to be quasilinear: v(s)+m. Informal care provided by the child is assumed to increase
utility at a decreasing rate. Therefore, vs > 0, and vss < 0. Because the parent cares about
the childs utility U , the parents utility function can be assumed as:
V = v(s) +m+ u(h; s) + (x): (5)
Let yP be the income of the parent, and let q be the price of formal care. The budget
constraint of the parent is then becomes:
yP = g + qm: (6)
The parent must ensure that the child receives a nonnegative benet from obtaining
parental gifts in order to be willing to supply informal care. This implies that the partial
derivative of the childs indirect utility function with respect to g is nonnegative. The change
in g directly a¤ects u and , and a¤ects h (see Eq. 3), which in turn a¤ects u and . Note
that, however, the latter indirect e¤ect drops out, because h is chosen optimally by the child
(the envelope theorem). Eventually, the condition of receiving gifts can be written as follows:
ussg + x
1
p
 0: (7)
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The parent faces the following ve constraints: nonnegative inter vivos gifts g  0, s = s(g),
the childs budget constraint Eq. (2), the home value function Eq. (3), the parents budget
constraint Eq. (6), and the condition of receiving gifts Eq. (7).
Substituting s = s(g), Eqs. (2), (3), and (6) into the utility function Eq. (5) yields the
result that the choice variables are reduced to only one variable: g. Suppose Vgg < 0 for the
the second-order condition of a maximum. Then, the optimal value of the gift satises:
vssg   1
q
+

ussg + x
1
p

 0: (8)
Note that we only consider the case where the bracket on the left-hand side of Eq. (8) is
nonnegative in the form of Eq. (7). Then, the optimal amount of the gift is zero when Eq. (8)
holds with inequality (corner solution), while it is positive when Eq. (8) holds with equality.
Solving the unconstrained utility maximization problem, we obtain the gift function. Be-
cause of the additive separable form, the gift function only depends on q when Eq. (7) is
binding. On the other hand, when Eq. (7) is not binding, the gift function has the general
form:
g = g(yC ; p; q): (9)
We are interested in the partial derivative of the price of formal care q. Because the private
utility function of the parent is assumed to be quasilinear and the formal care (m) is assumed
to be a substitute for the informal care (s), a rise in the price of formal care unambiguously
increases the amount of inter vivos transfers. Thus, @g=@q > 0. This result suggests that the
parent must depend on informal care when the market for formal care is limited. Then, the
assumption of a contract to exchange the gift for informal care may become a real possibility.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 The empirical model
Our data, which are introduced later, are based on a survey of childrens households i. For
the benchmark, the following linear from of the home value function is estimated by OLS:
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hi = Cgi +XC + "Ci; (10)
where hi is the observed purchase price of the house, gi is the observed value of the inter
vivos gift, which is the primary variable of interest, X is a vector of explanatory variables, C
and C are coe¢ cients, and "Ci is an error term. Instead of gi, we also consider Gi, which
is the observed zero-one dummy. The literature has suggested that the sign of C is likely to
be positive. Eq. (4) in the theoretical section, however, indicates that C may incorporate
both the positive e¤ect through the budget constraint and the negative e¤ect through the
utility function (uhs < 0), consequently the sign of C is ambiguous. Explanatory variables
include household income (yCi) and consumer price index (pi), which are presented in Eq. (3).
Following the literature, we also control household characteristics (householders age and land
endowment), regional-specic e¤ect (location dummy), and time-specic e¤ect (year dummy).
Note that we focus on hi > 0, because our data do not include hi = 0. Spilerman and Wol¤
(2012) also used only hi > 0 to capture the impact of intergenerational transfers on housing
consumption. Although their data include renters (hi = 0), they excluded renters from the
sample because transfers earmarked for a home purchase are not dened for them.
We, however, suspect that the C coe¢ cient estimated in Eq. (10) is likely to be biased
due to the endogeneity of the inter vivos gifts, which arises from the prospect of omitted
variables (see also Zhou 2007). In the theoretical section, we only consider the observable
characteristics in our dataset. There are, however, unobservable characteristics that a¤ect
parentchild behavior but are omitted from both Eqs. (3) and (10). For example, liquidity
constraints of children generally have a negative impact on housing consumption. An amount of
assets held by children could be a suitable proxy variable of liquidity constraints. The amount
of assets, however, is not available in our dataset. From an econometric point of view, the
OLS estimator of C in Eq. (10) does not properly reect Eq. (4), i.e. C is biased, if omitted
variables and inter vivos gifts are correlated. Nonzero correlation among these variables may
exist because our theoretical model indicates that parental gifts respond to all factors a¤ecting
housing consumption when children receive a positive benet from obtaining parental gifts
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(Eq. 9). In fact, McGarry (1999) suggested that children are more likely to receive inter vivos
gifts if they are liquidity constrained. If one were to neglect the positive correlation between
parental gifts and liquidity constraints of children, the OLS estimator of C is biased upwards.
To account for such endogeneity, we use the IV method. Our theoretical model informs us
that the price of formal care qi seems to be a valid variable for identication. On the one
hand, qi is expected to have an inuence on parental gifts (through Eq. 9), because formal care
substitutes for informal care. On the other hand, qi may have only indirect impacts on the
purchase price through gi, because children tend to care about informal care (that controlled
by gifts) rather than formal care (Eq. 3 does not depend on qi).
We must account for the fact that optimizing behavior leads to a corner solution response
for some signicant fraction of parents. Namely, observations of inter vivos gifts are limited to
values greater than or equal to zero (Eq. 8). To address this censoring issue, the literature has
estimated both the Probit and Tobit models: the Probit model is used to analyze the extensive
margin (the propensity to transfer), whereas the Tobit model is used to consider the incentive
margin (the amount of transfer) (Cox 1987; Auten and Joulfaian 1996; Laitner and Ohlsson
2001; Zhou 2007; Norton et al. 2013). Eventually, the gift value function Eq. (9) is assumed
to take the following linear form:
g#i = P qi +XP + "Pi; (11)
where g#i is an unobserved latent variable measuring parental gifts, P and P are coe¢ cients,
and "Pi is the error term.2 Then in the Probit model, the latent variable determines the
outcome observed for the zeroone dummy Gi:
Gi = 1; if g
#
i > 0
= 0; otherwise.
2As we mentioned in the theoretical section, the income of the parent, which may have an impact on inter
vivos gifts, is not available from the data. The exclusion of this variable tends to worsen the goodness of t of
the gift value function.
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On the other hand, in the Tobit model, the nonnegative value gi is dened as follows:
gi = g
#
i ; if g
#
i > 0
= 0; otherwise.
In this analysis, we employ the following IV procedure. In the rst stage, g#i is estimated
by either a Probit model or Tobit model. In the second stage, we use the tted value of gifts
from the rst-stage model, Eq. (11), as a generated instrument variable for the observed value
of gifts gi in Eq. (10). Consistent with the theoretical analysis, the procedure only allows the
instrumented value of gifts in Eq. (10) to take nonnegative values.
4.2 The data
The data come from the customer survey conducted by the Japan Federation of Housing
Organizations (JHO). Its members consist of various housing suppliers in Japan.3 The JHO
distributes a questionnaire to home builders whose customers bought a newly custom-built
detached house in the three major metropolitan areas of Tokyo, Nagoya, and Osaka, and the
four provincial cities of Sapporo, Sendai, Hiroshima, and Fukuoka. The Tokyo metropolitan
area includes Saitama, Tokyo Metropolitan, Chiba, and Kanagawa prefectures; the Nagoya
metropolitan area includes Gifu, Aichi, and Mie prefectures; and the Osaka metropolitan area
includes Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo, and Nara prefectures. Although the observations are limited to
the above areas, according to the Housing Starts (20012009) issued by the Ministry of Land,
Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT), the number of newly built owner-occupied
houses accounts for approximately 51.0 percent of such houses in Japan. Home builders do ask
their customers to report the transfer amount earmarked for home purchase (this is treated
as parental gifts in this paper), the total earned income of household members, and the price
paid for the property. The JHO conducts this survey every year and collects individual cross-
sectional data on approximately 3,000 home-buying households. We use the data from 2001
3Enterprises of various sizes are members of the JHO: not only large enterprises but also medium and
small enterprises. Various kinds of construction methodologies for housing suppliers are also included; e.g.,
prefabricated construction suppliers, wooden home suppliers, two-by-four home builders, and foreign-designed
homes. Details about the JHO are available at http://www.judanren.or.jp/english/index.html (accessed on 17
June, 2014).
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to 2009. The number of observations in the full sample is 3,131 in 2001; 3,000 in 2002; 3,047
in 2003; 2,794 in 2004; 3,634 in 2005; 3,540 in 2006; 3,241 in 2007; 3,206 in 2008; and 3,750 in
2009. Screening the data for complete information on the selected variables produces a sample
of 27,018 observations, which represents 92.1 percent of the full sample.
Table 1 presents the variable denitions for the endogenous, explanatory, and identication
variables. The notations in Table 1 correspond to the notations in the theoretical section.
For the childs income, we use the total annual income before tax earned by all members of
a childs household. Home purchases generally tend to rely on permanent income rather than
annual income. However, because we cannot observe permanent income, permanent income is
proxied by annual income. For the price of the composite good (p), we calculate the regional
CPI data in each year by multiplying the nationwide CPI and the regional di¤erences in the
index of consumer prices, which are obtained from the Statistics Bureau in the Ministry of
Internal A¤airs and Communications. Note that both the regional and the nationwide CPI do
not include imputed rents of owner-occupied housing.
The price of informal care, q, plays the important role of identifying the home value func-
tion. There are, however, the following two problems in obtaining this variable. First, we
cannot obtain the parentsresidential location from the data. We thus assume that children
and parents reside in the same region. According to the 2004 wave of the Keio Household Panel
Survey, sponsored by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, ap-
proximately 80 percent of senior parents and adult children dwell in the same prefecture in
Japan.4 Second, we must nd market substitutes for informal care. In this paper, we consider
the long-term care (LTC) services provided by the market. However, we cannot obtain the
market price of LTC, because it is controlled by the government. Instead, we use the capacity
of LTC institutions in each prefecture, which is obtained from the Survey of Institutions and
Establishments for Long-term Care (Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare). Izuhara (2006)
suggested that LTC institutions are unevenly distributed across the country, which results in a
shortage of such institutions in some regions. Therefore, LTC institutions may ensure su¢ cient
4The Keio Household Panel Survey is available at http://www.pdrc.keio.ac.jp/en/ (accessed on 17 June,
2014).
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variation. From the denition in Table 1, the numerator (number of hospital beds) may reect
the supply side for market care services, while the denominator (elderly population) may reect
the demand side for them. LTC capacity thus probably proxies the accessibility of formal care.
Contrary to the expected sign of the price of formal care (q), the expected sign of LTC capacity
becomes negative. We thus take the inverse of q in Table 1. In addition to LTC capacity, we
consider professional care services in the home in each prefecture, data that are also available
from the above survey. We create a variable called home helper, which equals the number of
home helpers divided by the elderly population. We include this variable because the LTC
insurance system aims to encourage not institutional care but rather home-based care. It is
intended that home-based care will provide senior people with care from their family at home
with some assistance from professional care service providers.
To reduce the omitted variable bias, we incorporate the age of householders and its squared
value into the set of explanatory variables. As mentioned in Section 1, home ownership rates of
younger generations have been declining substantially in Japan. According to the 2008 Housing
and Land Survey conducted by MLIT, home ownership rates of individuals aged 30 years or
less experienced more than a 10 percentage point decline from 1988 to 2008. This suggests
that the amount of housing services consumed may also decline for younger generations. In
addition, we use a dummy variable for land acquisition in our analysis. Because the purchase
price of housing includes the land acquisition cost, children who have already bought land can
deduct this cost from the purchase price. We also include four location dummies, comprising:
Tokyo area (reference); Nagoya area; Osaka area; and provincial cities. This is because the
price of housing generally depends on location, and geographical dummies may control this
factor. Finally, because it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the full set of
reasons, we include year dummies to control for other factors that may a¤ect the values of
both gifts and homes. For example, even though the Japanese tax system for inter vivos
gifts is very friendly to children receiving gifts from parents because of the relatively large
basic exception amount, children must pay tax in some cases. The Japanese government also
provides housing incentives such as the mortgage tax deduction (MTD). The MTD allows
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home-buying households to deduct a percentage of their mortgage balance from their income
taxes. However, as neither gift taxes nor the amounts of the deduction are reported, we cannot
directly control for them.
Table 2 provides summary statistics. The mean home purchase price is approximately 42.55
million yen, which is approximately 0.82 million yen lower than the national average purchase
price of custom-built detached houses in the Housing Market Trend Survey (20012009, HMTS)
issued by the MLIT. Table 2 indicates that approximately 19.0 percent of observations involved
a positive gift. The mean gift value is 1.96 million yen, which is approximately 0.80 million
yen higher than the national average in the HMTS (20012009). The mean childrens income
is 8.73 million yen, which is 1.54 million yen higher than the mean households income in the
HMTS (20012009). The mean householders age is 42.97 years, which is 0.73 years younger
than that in the HMTS (20012009).
Table 3 provides the di¤erence in mean values between the respondents who received gifts
and those who did not. On average, childrens income without a gift is 1.57 million yen higher
than for children with a gift. Although children with a gift receive approximately 10 million
yen on average, they consume 0.62 million yen less than children without a gift. This suggests
that parental gifts tend not to increase the purchase price of housing. Of course, these numbers
are simply raw averages and should be treated with caution in relation to other factors and
the endogeneity issues mentioned above. Fig. 1, which represents the kernel densities of the
home value, also stresses that the exact direction of the e¤ect of gifts on the home value is
ambiguous. The solid line refers to the density of the home value with a gift, while the dashed
line refers to that of the home value without a gift. Note that we exclude the higher values
from this gure by 3 in order to facilitate the comparison of these densities. If gifts have a
positive impact on the value of acquired houses, as suggested by the literature, then the home
value distribution with gifts shifts rightward. Indeed, Fig. 1 indicates that the higher tail of
the distribution with gifts shifts rightward. The lower tail of the distribution, however, shifts
leftward.
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4.3 Estimation results
Models [1] and [2] in Table 4 provide the OLS estimation results. Model [1] considers the zero
one dummy of inter vivos gifts, whereas model [2] considers their observed value. Both models
[1] and [2] indicate that inter vivos gifts have a signicantly positive e¤ect on the value of
acquired houses, which is consistent with previous studies (Engelhardt and Mayer 1998; Guiso
and Jappelli 2002; Zhou 2007; Luea 2008; Spilerman and Wol¤ 2012). Model [2] indicates that
a one million yen increase in gifts increases the value of the home purchased by approximately
0.494 million yen. The following two studies also demonstrated that the increment in home
value is less than the gift amount, which is similar to our result. That is, Guiso and Jappelli
(2002) found that for each one euro in gifts, home value rises by 0.46 euros, and Luea (2008)
found that for each one dollar in gifts, home value rises by 0.20 dollars. The childs income has
a positive sign and is signicant; therefore, housing consumption is a normal good. The price
index suggests that the substitution e¤ect outweighs the income e¤ect, because the coe¢ cient
is signicant and positive. Therefore, children tend to purchase more expensive housing when
housing-related conditions are favorable to them. Age and its squared value indicate that older
households spend more on housing at a decreasing rate. As expected, younger households are
more likely to purchase less expensive dwellings in Japan. The signicantly positive sign of
land indicates that households who have already obtained land tend to spend more on housing
than others.
Models [3] and [4] in Table 4 report the results of the IV method. We nd that the
coe¢ cient of the gift dummy in the second stage is statistically insignicant in model [3].
Model [4] demonstrates that a one million yen increment in gifts increases the home value by
approximately 0.139 million yen. This impact is smaller than that in model [2] and statistically
insignicant. The coe¢ cients of both the gift dummy and gift are statistically insignicant,
potentially because the standard errors of the IV estimates (models 3 and 4) are larger than
those of the OLS estimates (models 1 and 2). This suggests that LTC capacity and home
helper are likely to be weak instruments. We, however, claim that both variables are not weak
for the following two reasons. First, as mentioned below, each coe¢ cient is signicant in the
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rst stage in both models [3] and [4]. Second, each F -statistic for joint signicance of LTC
capacity and home helper is su¢ ciently larger than the rule of thumb value of 10, which is
the criterion suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997): 32.48 in model [3] and 13.42 in model
[4]. In summary, contrary to common belief, these results indicate that adult children do
not necessarily increase their housing consumption after they receive parental gifts. This is
probably because the positive impact through the budget is reversed by the negative impact
through the childrens utility (uhs < 0). Namely, an informal care responsibility tends to
be quite a burden for children; consequently, parental gifts tied with both informal care and
housing acquisition discourage childrens demand for housing.
Because inter vivos gifts are intended for home purchases, adult children probably use all
of them to increase their down payment and to reduce mortgage debt by the same amount.
In the context of Engelhardt and Mayer (1998), this implies that housing consumption, which
is the sum of down payment and mortgage debt, is not a¤ected by inter vivos gifts (on page
150). Our theory then suggests that adult children may increase nonhousing consumption by
using their income, instead of increasing housing consumption. This result is consistent with
Spilerman and Wol¤ (2012) to some degree, which is shown in Section 2.2.
In the rst stage of models [3] and [4] in Table 4, we nd that children are statistically
more likely to receive parental transfers when their household income is low and when house-
holders are young (the coe¢ cient of age squared is relatively large and negative), which is
consistent with the literature (Engelhardt and Mayer 1998; Cirman 2008). The coe¢ cients
of LTC capacity, which are associated with the variable for identication, are signicant and
negative, indicating that children are less likely to receive transfers when seniors access to
LTC institutions is improved. This may suggest that parents can rely on formal care and
consequently reduce intergenerational transfers to induce informal care. Moreover, this result
may be consistent to some extent with the ndings of Izuhara (2004). She suggested that the
link between childrens support and transfers is increasingly being weakened in Japan. The
coe¢ cients of home helper, however, have a signicant and positive sign, which runs contrary
to our expectation. An explanation of this unexpected result can be found in Abe (2009).
19
Abe (2009) claimed that LTC insurance system has reduced the burden on families to a small
extent. She demonstrated that professional care services at home only serve as a minor sup-
plement to familial care. This indicates that parents who rely on professional care at home
must rely on informal care at home as well, and accordingly transfers being received increase
both the extensive and the intensive margins.
4.4 Subsample analysis
In this section, we divide the sample into age: householders aged less than 35 years (< 35)
and those aged 35 years or more (35 +), because some papers have considered young adult
children. For example, the data used by Engelhardt and Mayer (1998) have an average age
that is approximately 10 years younger than our data. Mulder and Smits (1999) limited their
analysis to couples up to the age of 40 to ensure some homogeneity in terms of stage of life;
young couples are generally still in the process of family formation and career development.
Although not explicitly stated, it is likely that Zhou (2007) considered relatively young couples,
because the analysis was limited to couples with preschool children.
We again adopt the IV procedure. Only the results of the home value function (the second
stage) are reported in Table 5. The coe¢ cient of the gift dummy in model [5] indicates a
signicant and positive e¤ect on younger childrens demand for housing, which di¤ers from
model [3] in Table 4. Model [6] also suggests that the coe¢ cient of gift has a signicant and
positive sign. Namely, a one million yen increment in gifts increases the value of the home
purchased by approximately 1.297 million yen. Similar to Engelhardt and Mayer (1998), the
e¤ect of an increment in gifts on the purchase price of housing is greater than the amount of
gifts. They found for each dollar in gifts, home value rises by 1.34 dollars. The signicant
and positive impact of gifts on home value may be observed because gifts relax the liquidity
constraint involved in purchasing a house. As mentioned, it is di¢ cult for young adults today
to get a permanent job (see also Öst 2012). Young adults thus have faced a severe liquidity
constraint in purchasing a home. Cirman (2008) suggested that intergenerational transfers
are used in such a situation. In other words, parentsbehavior is based on a relatively weak
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exchange motive. Because the positive sg reects the exchange motive of parents in our context,
sg is relatively small for young adults in Eq. (4). The other reason that may explain the
signicant and positive sign relates to sg. Parents of younger adult children are less likely to
have health deterioration issues, because they are likely to be younger themselves. In this sense,
young adults receive parental gifts without the expectation of the heavy burden of informal
care, and again sg is relatively small in Eq. (4). Of course, other explanations are possible
from Eq. (4): younger adult children are less likely to be in charge of care obligations, and
consequently the absolute value of uhs is relatively small; the positive impact of gifts through
the budget constraint @h=@yC may be relatively large for younger adult children. On the other
hand, models [7] and [8] suggest that gifts received after middle age have no signicant impact
on housing consumption, indicating that parentsbehavior is based on exchange.
All the signs of the coe¢ cients of childs income and price index in Table 5 are the same
as those in models [3] and [4] in Table 4. The signs of the coe¢ cient of age and its squared
value in models [5] and [6] are di¤erent from those in models [3] and [4] in Table 4, and
statistically signicant. Because the coe¢ cient of age squared is relatively large and positive,
the estimated result in model [6] shows that the purchase price of housing reaches a minimum
at approximately 26 years, and then increases until the age of 35 years. On the other hand,
the coe¢ cients of age and its squared value in models [7] and [8] are statistically insignicant,
suggesting that the value of the home purchased is not a¤ected by the age of the subgroup
aged 35 years and over.
5 Conclusion
Previous studies in relation to inter vivos gifts and home purchases have paid little attention to
the exchange motive of parents and children. In contrast, this paper has assumed that children
provide informal care services in exchange for gifts. Theoretical models suggest that inter vivos
gifts do not always raise the purchase price of housing. This contradicts the idea of altruism:
inter vivos gifts tend to increase the purchase price. The theoretical reason underlying our
hypothesis is that the positive impact of gifts on housing consumption through the budget
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constraint is weakened by the negative impact through the utility function of children. In
our model, childrens marginal utility of housing was assumed to decrease when informal care
increases. Because inter vivos gifts were earmarked to be used for housing acquisition in our
data, this assumption might be valid to some degree. Namely, children are more likely to
hesitate when purchasing a higher-priced dwelling using their parental gifts because gifts are
associated with a heavy burden of informal care.
To test our hypothesis, we used data of households who purchased a detached house in an
urban area of Japan. Carefully controlling for potential endogeneity of inter vivos gifts, which
are identied by information on formal care, and considering censoring of inter vivos gifts, our
preferred empirical results indicated that inter vivos gifts do not have a signicant impact on
the purchase price of housing. Namely, inter vivos gifts appear to have almost no e¤ect, which
is consistent with the exchange motive. Moreover, the empirical results demonstrated that
inter vivos gifts are signicantly a¤ected by formal care. This suggests that variables related
to formal care are useful in considering the endogeneity of gifts, which generally have been
overlooked by the literature.
We do not intend to argue against altruism as a motivation for providing informal care. In
some countries, it is expected by society that children will look after their parents. In relation
to this point, suppose that children are altruistic. They may invest a relatively large amount
of money in housing and at the same time provide a service for their parents while refusing to
receive a large parental gift. Then, inter vivos gifts may also have only small impacts on the
home value. Instead, exchange may be an additional motivator in a society where informal
care of parents involves the childrens lives being substantially burdened. Japanese society
indeed has been told that children were on the verge of collapsing under the heavy burden of
nursing care for their aged parents (Izuhara 2004).
Even though neither the theoretical model nor the empirical model includes any policy
parameters, our result may be useful for evaluating them. For example, to stimulate domestic
demand, the Japanese government introduced a tax waiver for children receiving inter vivos
gifts for the acquisition of a home, which may encourage parents to donate money to their
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children for the purchase of a higher-priced home. To repeat, however, our preferred empirical
results demonstrated that inter vivos gifts have little impact on childrens demand for housing.
Subsample analysis suggested that the motivation behind parental gifts tends to be inu-
enced by the timing of childrens home purchases in the life course. We found that inter vivos
gifts still have no statistically signicant e¤ect on the purchase price of housing for children
who are relatively old. Yet, parental gifts signicantly increase the purchase price of homes of
children who are relatively young, even when we consider both censoring and endogeneity of
inter vivos gifts. One possible explanation is that parentsbehavior is less likely to be based
on the exchange motive for young home buyers.
In line with the results of the subsample analysis, we must examine selectivity bias. Because
our data only include newly custom-built detached houses, both ready-built detached houses
and condominium units are not included. If home buyers who are relatively young prefer such
homes, then parental gifts may have a positive impact on the value of the acquired home.
This suggests that our conclusion, which used all observations, su¤ers from sample selection
bias toward the null. Nevertheless, the data are meaningful for testing whether exchange is
an additional motive to consider in examining the relationship between inter vivos gifts and
housing acquisition.
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Table	1:	Definition	of	variables	
Variable	 Definition Notation
Endogenous	 	
Housing	 	 The	purchase	price	of	housing,	in	millions	of	yen ݄
Gift	dummy	 	 A	binary	variable	indicating	that	the	household	receives	a positive	amount	of	gifts	 ݃
Gift	 	 The	value	of	gifts,	in	millions	of	yen ݃
Explanatory	 	
Child's	income	 The	total	annual	income	before	tax	earned	by	all	household members,	in	millions	of	
yen	
ݕ஼
Price	index	 	 The	regional	CPI,	which	is	the	product	of	the	CPI	(2005=100)	and the	regional	
difference	index	of	consumer	prices	(national	average	set	equal	to	100),	percentage	
݌
Identification	 	
LTC	capacity	 	 The	capacity	of	long‐term	care	institutions	for	senior	citizens in	each	geographical	
category,	thousands	of	hospital	beds	per	hundred	thousand	elderly	
1/ݍ
Home	helper	 	 The	number	of	home	helpers	for	senior	citizens	in	each geographical	category,	
thousands	of	helpers	per	hundred	thousand	elderly	
1/ݍ
Other	control	 	
Age	 Age	of	householder,	years	 –
Land	 	 A	binary	variable	indicating	that	the	household	bought	land	in	the	last	three	years	 –
Tokyo	area	 A	binary	variable	indicating	that	the	house	is	located	in	the Tokyo	area	(reference)	 –
Nagoya	area	 A	binary	variable	indicating	that	the	house	is	located	in	the Nagoya	area	 –
Osaka	area	 A	binary	variable	indicating	that	the	house	is	located	in	the Osaka	area	 –
Provincial	city	 A	binary	variable	indicating	that	the	house	is	located	in one	of	the	provincial	cities	 –
Notes:	Geographical	category	in	LTC	capacity	and	home	helper	corresponding	with	the	prefecture	level	for	three	major	
metropolitan	areas	
Geographical	category	in	LTC	capacity	and	home	helper	corresponding	with	the	major	cities	level	are	converted	to	the	
prefecture	level,	because	they	are	only	observed	at	the	prefecture	level	
Year	dummies	are	not	reported	
Table	2:	Descriptive	statistics	of	the	full	sample	
Variable	 Mean Std.	Dev. Min.	 Max.
Housing	(million	yen)	 42.55 23.29 0.25	 524.00
Gift	dummy	(dummy)	 0.19 0.39 0.00	 1.00
Gift	(million	yen)	 1.96 6.44 0.00	 310.00
Child's	income	(million	yen) 8.73 6.17 0.00	 210.00
Price	index	(percent)	 105.27 3.55 99.09	 112.61
Age	(years)	 42.97 11.67 20.00	 92.00
Land	(dummy)	 0.44 0.50 0.00	 1.00
LTC	capacity	(1,000	beds/100,000	elderly)	 2.33 0.34 1.60	 3.26
Home	helper	(1,000	person/100,000	elderly) 1.54 0.42 0.71	 2.67
	 	
Observations	 	 27018 	
Notes:	Both	location	dummies	and	year	dummies	are	not	reported	
	
Table	3:	Mean	for	households	with	and	without	a	gift	
Variable	 Total With	a	gift	 Without	a	gift
Housing	(million	yen)	 42.55 42.04 42.66	
Gift	dummy	(dummy)	 0.19 1.00 0.00	
Gift	(million	yen)	 1.96 10.49 0.00	
Child's	income	(million	yen) 8.73 7.45 9.02	
	 	
Observations	 	 27018 5058 21960
Table	4:	Estimation	results	
Variable	 OLS IV	
	 [1]	 [2] [3] [4]
Housing	(2nd	stage)	 	 	
Gift	dummy	 1.909*** – –4.791	 –	
	 (0.272) – (7.820)	 –	
Gift	 –	 0.494*** – 0.139
	 –	 (0.047) – (0.870)
Child’s	income	 1.562*** 1.569*** 1.535***	 1.559***
	 (0.108) (0.106) (0.112)	 (0.111)
Price	index	 1.020*** 0.985*** 1.020***	 1.010***
	 (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)	 (0.079)
Age	 0.532*** 0.540*** 0.448***	 0.517***
	 (0.111) (0.110) (0.147)	 (0.123)
Age	squared	 –0.003*** –0.003*** –0.003**	 	 –0.003***
	 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)	 (0.001)
Land	 20.437*** 20.008*** 20.502***	 20.329***
	 (0.296) (0.300) (0.313)	 (0.866)
Constant	 	 –107.973*** –104.826*** –103.238***	 	 –106.118***
	 (5.600) (5.573) (7.801)	 (6.567)
	 	  
R2	 0.421	 0.438 0.430	 0.429
Gift	(1st	stage)	 	  	
Child’s	income	 	 –0.029***	 –0.455***
	 	 (0.005)	 (0.138)
Price	index	 	 –0.012***	 –0.112
	 	 (0.005)	 (0.090)
Age	 	 0.016*	 0.515***
	 	 (0.009)	 (0.198)
Age	squared	 	 –0.001***	 –0.012***
	 	 (0.000)	 (0.002)
Land	 	 0.052***	 2.419***
	 	 (0.020)	 (0.395)
LTC	capacity	 	 –0.203***	 –3.081***
	 	 (0.039)	 (0.747)
Home	helper	 	 0.173***	 3.633***
	 	 (0.044)	 (0.837)
Constant	 	 1.376***	 0.939
	 	 (0.525)	 (10.340)
	 	 	
Log	likelihood	 	 –12033.16 –29378.49
Notes:	27,018	observations	
Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	 	
All	models	are	controlled	by	location	and	year	dummies	
***,	**,	*	indicate	significant	at	1%,	5%,	10%,	respectively
Table	5:	The	IV	estimation	results	of	the	subsample	 	
Variable	 <	35 35	+	
	 [5]	 [6] [7] [8]
Housing	(2nd	stage)	 	 	
Gift	dummy	 15.186* – –15.870 –	
	 (8.254) – (11.044)	 –	
Gift	 –	 1.297** – –1.376
	 –	 (0.623) – (1.862)
Child’s	income	 1.585*** 1.531*** 1.501***	 	 1.522***
	 (0.190) (0.173) (0.123)	 (0.132)
Price	index	 0.708*** 0.543*** 1.051***	 1.132***
	 (0.073) (0.122) (0.060)	 (0.103)
Age	 –4.045** –3.346*** –0.146 –0.094
	 (1.608) (1.261) (0.234)	 (0.307)
Age	squared	 0.077*** 0.065*** 0.002 0.002
	 (0.027) (0.021) (0.002)	 (0.002)
Land	 12.885*** 11.928*** 23.490***	 24.594***
	 (0.351) (0.682) (0.425)	 (1.689)
Constant	 	 –10.201	 1.076 –89.006***	 	 –101.451***
	 (24.533) (26.517) (12.634)	 (8.665)
	 	 	
R2	 0.3050 0.3484 0.3635	 0.2408
Observations	 7338	 7338	 19680	 19680
Notes:	Robust	standard	errors	in	parentheses	
All	models	are	controlled	by	location	and	year	dummies	
The	results	of	the	gift	value	function	(1st	stage)	are	not	reported	
***,	**,	*	indicate	significant	at	1%,	5%,	10%,	respectively	
	
	
Fig.	1:	Kernel	densities	of	home	value	
	
	
	
 
